Cryptography in the Database: The Last Line of Defense (Symantec Press)
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Cryptography in the Database: The Last Line of Defense (Symantec Press)


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Cryptography in the Database: The Last Line of Defense (Symantec Press)
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Cryptography in the Database: The Last Line of Defense (Symantec Press)

by Kevin Kenan
Product Group: Book
Publisher: Addison-Wesley Professional (2005-10-29)
ISBN: 0321320735
EAN: 9780321320735
Dewey Decimal #: 005.82
Paperback: 312 pages
SKU: 110508000358
Condition: New
Comments: 0321320735 New, never read, may have minor wear on cover.


Editorial Reviews


Product Description
Protect Your Enterprise Data with Rock-Solid Database Encryption If hackers compromise your critical information, the results can be catastrophic. You're under unprecedented pressure--from your customers, your partners, your stockholders, and now, the government--to keep your data secure. But what if hackers evade your sophisticated security mechanisms? When all else fails, you have one last powerful line of defense: database cryptography. In this book, a leading crypto expert at Symantec demonstrates exactly how to use encryption with your own enterprise databases and applications. Kevin Kenan presents a start-to-finish blueprint and execution plan for designing and building--or selecting and integrating--a complete database cryptosystem. Kenan systematically shows how to eliminate weaknesses, overcome pitfalls, and defend against attacks that can compromise data even if it's been protected by strong encryption. This book's 3,000 lines of downloadable code examples let you explore every component of a live database cryptosystem, including key vaults and managers, manifests, engines, and providers.This book's coverage includes * Understanding your legal obligations to protect data * Constructing a realistic database security threat model and ensuring that you address critical threats * Designing robust database cryptographic infrastructure around today's most effective security patterns * Hardening your database security requirements * Classifying the sensitivity of your data * Writing database applications that interact securely with your cryptosystem * Avoiding the common vulnerabilities that compromise database applications * Managing cryptographic projects in your enterprise database environment * Testing, deploying, defending, and decommissioning secure database applications Cryptography in the Database is an indispensable resource for every professional who must protect enterprise data: database architects, administrators, and developers; system and security analysts; and many others. A(c) Copyright Pearson Education. All rights reserved.


Customer Reviews


It's a good book, but...
Rating (3)
Date: 2007-09-26

1 out of 1 customers found this reveiw helpful


I purchased the book in attempt to figure out a "best practice" way to encrypt information in a web-facing business database.

I think the book delivered a best-practice approach, but I didn't find it as useful as I'd hoped despite learning a lot both theoretically and practically.

There are a number of caveats I wish I'd known about this book, in rough order of importance:

1) If you aren't using HSM hardware to store the keys, this book's practical usefulness appears to decline a fair bit, a point the author seems to acknowledge. Your key information ends up stored in databases or systems which themselves can be compromised. There's a lot of machinery to encrypt the keys and replace them over time, but fundamentally you are just raising barriers with this approach, not really securing anything (as far as I can tell). It seemed like a lot of implementation complexity for a mild amount of obscurity, as far as I was concerned (since the book is published!) If, say, you have a webserver connecting to a database and your webserver is compromised, and the attacker can get to your database, the encryption here will slow, but not stop them. If only the database or its backup is compromised though, his stuff is great; it'd be hard to recover the data. But that's not the threat model I think most web-facing database companies are concerned about; there the webserver gets compromised first. In a webserver+database-noHSM model, I'm not sure all the obscurity his system provides is worth the implementation complexity-- a simpler alternative approach that provides most of the benefits would have been helpful.

2) The book's approach does not describe/give-code-for any practices or infrastructure in which one might store (or migrate) some information (e.g. credit cards) offline in an attempt to secure it, placing the information online only temporarily (e.g. when doing recurring billing, sending email blasts with personal information, etc).

3) The book does not cover any asymmetric encryption techniques, dismissing them early on since they "aren't necessary for solving the problems in which we're interested". Maybe I'm missing something, but it would seem to me that if the usage/data-retrieval model for one's application allowed use of offline private keys (or a password to unencrypt an private key) entered at the time of data retrieval, data in the database could be stored write-only by an application (using a public key stored in a database) and delivered read-only only-to-an-authorized-user without ever storing the key information necessary for read-able retrieval in any online database. (This assumes the information never needs to be read by the application without the user present.)

4) The Java code is fairly helpful but, as the author notes, it's a prototype and you will need to add alerting and exception handling for any production system.

All this doesn't make the book "bad"; it's a very good primer on symmetrically encrypting information in a database and managing the entire security process surrounding that. I concur with the other good reviews here; it probably is a 4-5 star book for most people. But I found myself just hoping for something simpler (given the assumption of no HSM) and/or more secure (when facing different usage constraints) than what I was left with.


Good for developers
Rating (4)
Date: 2006-03-10

13 out of 14 customers found this reveiw helpful


To be honest, when picking up this book, I was not interested in implementation details and internals of database cryptography (part II), but more in enabling database security by means of encryption (part I). Therefore, I was coming more from the user vs developer perspective. I was even less interested in managing the database cryptographic project.

As a result, I enjoyed the part I on database security with motivations, attacks against databases, threat models and a primer on securing databases with cryptography. If you are "doing security" read part I, if you are implementing database encryption or record hashing - read the rest of the book.

Dr Anton Chuvakin, GCIA, GCIH, GCFA is a recognized security expert and book author. A frequent conference speaker, he also participates in various security industry initiatives and standard organizations. He is an author of a book "Security Warrior" and a contributor to "Know Your Enemy II", "Information Security Management Handbook" and the upcoming "Hacker's Challenge 3". He also published numerous papers on a broad range of security subjects. In his spare time he maintains his security portal http://www.info-secure.org and a blog at http://chuvakin.blogspot.com


A little more like "Cryptography Alongside The Database"
Rating (4)
Date: 2005-12-17

4 out of 5 customers found this reveiw helpful


I kind of went in expecting this to be some form of "marketing spiel" for someone's embedding of crypto tools into one or another DBMS. I was pleasantly surprised, instead, to see that this was much more an "analytical" work; something of an account of some of the practices at Symantec.

What is particularly laudable is that they start not by explaining crypto technologies, but rather motivating things by enumerating a threat model. Sensitive data needs to be protected from various sorts of attacks that can come from outsiders as well as insiders, the latter requiring *much* more care as they may legitimately need to have access.

The assumption (which seems entirely valid) is that crypto keys need to be particularly carefully managed as a *very* tightly restricted database of their own.

The examples quite conspicuously *don't* involve cryptography taking place inside the database; that practice is one that would necessarily be equivalent to giving all of the keys to the DBAs and/or system administrators, as they control database engine deployment. Instead, crypto activity takes place outside the database; secure applications require a particularly secured portion of the application infrastructure.

The one place that they get a bit "hand-wavy" is in proposing that Hardware Security Modules are the only really forcible way to achieve strong security. I tend to agree with that doctrine; I suspect they intentionally glossed over it in that their approach of using standard Java libraries for all of their examples did not admit the ability to use HSMs. Implementing an HSM requires going to a great deal of trouble, and that feels like it ought to be a subsequent project for another book.

In view of emerging sorts of privacy legislation that mandate keeping data secure, this looks like one of the books that anyone storing sensitive information should read and heed...


Excellent book on database security
Rating (5)
Date: 2005-11-30

7 out of 9 customers found this reveiw helpful


Noted security guru Marcus Ranum has observed that "these days, with the kind of plug-ins that come in your typical browser, combined with all the bizarre undocumented protocols used by new Internet applications; makes it highly unlikely that a firewall is doing anything more complex than a thin layer of policy atop routing. As such, the applications behind the firewall are now more critical to security than the firewall itself. Which should scare the holey moley out of you."

Taking Ranum's observation to the next level, it is not only the applications that need to be secured, but databases also. The theme of Cryptography in the Database - The Last Line of Defense is that databases, being the main repository for critical consumer and business data, are often not given the adequate level of security that they deserve.

Large databases often contain terabytes of data. This data often contains R&D, client, customer data and more, that if compromised, could wreak havoc on an organization; both from a public relations perspective, in addition to a regulatory perspective. In a large customer driven organization, a database breach can wreak havoc on tens of thousands of customer records. With all of that, companies will spend large amounts of money on the security appliance of the month, but often let their databases sit unprotected.

Cryptography in the Database is a valuable book in that it shows how a formal methodology is required to adequately protect large corporate databases. The emphasis of the book is on designing and integrating a cryptosystem into the database to protect it against the various threats that are specifically launched against corporate database systems.

The books 4 parts contain 21 chapters. Part one is brief overview of the need for database security, along with related threats to database, and also covers the basic concepts of cryptography and encryption.

Part two provides a comprehensive synopsis on the cryptographic infrastructure necessary to secure corporate databases. Chapter 3 goes into details on how to set up an effective key management scheme. Such a scheme is crucial as the author notes that all it takes is the loss of a single 128-bit key, and gigabytes of data can become inaccessible.

Part two also creates a sample cryptographic architecture that is flexible and modular so that it is easily adaptable to various situations. The author notes that such systems can be difficult to manage if they become overly complex, and the challenge is to find the right balance between security and complexity on one side, and usability on the other. Creating an effective cryptographic database infrastructure. is not an elementary task given the different requirements of security and functionality.

Chapter 3 details the various entities that go into a complete cryptographic architecture, including the cryptographic engine, and the various controls around the crypto keys. The chapter provides a good overview of the key life cycle. Historically, controls around the key life cycle are crucial. One of the ways the Allies were able to break the German Enigma cipher machine during World War II was that the German's reused their crypto keys, which obviates much of the security that cryptography can provide. Had the German's not done that, the outcome of the war may have been dramatically different.

Part 3 details the issues that need to go into the entire cryptography project. Kenan notes that for security to be effective, it must be dealt with at the commencement of a project and must permeate the overall design and seep into every line of code. Also, in the long term, developing a culture of security depends on looking at security as an opportunity to provide extra value. Where security fails is when it is viewed merely as a series of checklists that are meant to get in the way.

Chapter 9 shows how data flow diagrams can be used by a database analyst to better understand how a system works. These data flow diagrams are valuable as that they show the various inputs into the system and where potential failures can crop up.

Part 4 provides various Java code examples of the cryptographic infrastructure that were detailed in the previous 12 chapters. The example code is meant to show how to implement the primary functionality of the various components that the book describes.

One of the popular terms in security today is data at rest, which refers to all data in storage. Businesses, government agencies, and others need to deal with attacks on data at rest, which more often then not will be found on databases.

After reading Cryptography in the Database, the reader can understand why database cryptography must be implemented in a methodological fashion, since incorrectly implemented cryptography can often be worse than no cryptography at all. With that, database administrators, architects and others who have input into the design of database security are highly advised to read Cryptography in the Database.

Databases are far too critical to an organization to be left unsecured, or incorrectly secured. The database is indeed the last line of defense in an organization. Books such as this are thusly vital to ensure that the last line of defense is not easily breached.


An Excellent Reference for Database Security and Encryption
Rating (5)
Date: 2005-11-11

9 out of 10 customers found this reveiw helpful


When I pick up a Symantec Press book, I will either love them or dislike them. I never have mixed emotions about them. This book I love. His book should be titled, Database Security. While the primary focus is on encryption, the author dives into several topics I wish some of my past DBAs had known.

The book is divided into four major parts: Database Security, A Crpytographic Infrastructure, The Cryptographic project, and Example Code. I however would calssify the book into two major parts. The first part is reading and understanding some fundamentals that are very important. Throughout this first part, there are many graphical presentations to help the reader understand, in a graphical way, what the author is discussing. This is most visible in the third chapter entitled An overview of Cryptographic Infrastructure.

The second part of the book is actual code written in Java, and designed for plain SQL, the author does confirm that all examples work in MYSQL. The examples give common scenarios such as consumer input. Consumer input requires first name, last name, credit card information, the verification code and other fields. This example discusses and demonstrates a best practice model around that code.

Given the two parts above, this book is solid, and I would have recommended it. However, the author went a step further, and included information on security surrounding the database, penetration testing and methodologies for databases, architecture and design best practices, and so many other important points. This makes this book valuable to anyone working with databases.

The section breakdown is as follows:
* Database Security - Common Attacks Against Databases; Laws and Regulations; and Cryptography
* Cryptographic Infrastructure - Introduction to Keys, and Their Management; Engines and Algorithms; and Vaults, Manifests and Managers
* The Cryptographic Project - Outlines the Security Culture; Hardening, Classifications, and Policies; Securing Design; Securing Development; and Testing
* Example Code - Key Vaults; Manifest; Key Managers; Engines; Receipts and the Provider; The Consumer; Exceptions; and the System at Work.

Overall this book is geared to medium level technicians for best practices and coding examples. Although anyone working with databases in general could find something useful in this book, even if its design, architecture and implementation best practices.

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